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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
CASENO.20070075-CA
PlaintifFAppellee,
vs.
HERBERT LANDRY,
Defendant/Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Landry has met his burden of marshaling all of the evidence that could
be construed as supporting the jury verdict in this case. However, even when
considering all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, it is
still insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr* Landry committed
the crime of aggravated arson.
ARGUMENT
L

MR. LANDRY HAS MARSHALED ALL OF THE RELEVANT
EVIDENCE.
The State argues that Mr. Landry failed to meet his marshaling burden on

this appeal. BRIEF OF APPELLEE ("Br. Appe.") at 12-21. Specifically, the State
claims Mr. Landry failed to marshal the evidence of Mr. Landry's alleged "hurried
retreat from his burning apartment95 (Id. at 15), and the "evidence in support of the

inference ... that defendant started the fire not with a heptane-based ignitable
liquid, but with alcohol." Id at 20. The State argues that this allegedly
unmarshaled evidence suggests "the fire was intentionally set" and Mr. Landry
was the one who set it. Id.
There are several flaws in the State's argument failure-to-marshal
argument. Mr. Landry did marshal the evidence that the State believes is
significant, including a witness' testimony that he saw Mr. Landry "hurriedly
walk[] by five minutes before the fire." BRIEF OF APPELLANT ("Br. Appt") at 5.
Further, while part of Mr. Landry's defense was that the fire was started
accidentally with alcohol, during it's case in chief, the State presented evidence to
suggest that Mr. Landry intentionally started the fire using a heptane-containing
substance.
Rex Nelson, a State's witness and fire investigator with Unified Fire in Salt
Lake City, testified that his accelerant detection canine, Oscar, was trained to
detect various ignitable liquids, but not including alcohol. Rl 18:101-03, 107, 111.
Oscar purportedly alerted in three different locations inside the southeast bedroom
where the fire originated. Rl 18:104-05, 137. Oscar also purportedly alerted on
one of Mr. Landry's socks and one of his shoes, although there was no crime lab
report indicating any flammable substance in those items. Rl 18:106. The State's
own evidence was that Oscar would not have alerted if alcohol was the flammable
liquid used to start the fire because Oscar was not trained to detect alcohol, and
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because any traces of alcohol would have dissipated or would have been
undetectable as a result of the volume of water used to put out the fire. Rl 18:169.
The Orem City fire marshal, Russ Sneddon, testified for the State that
several items were sent to the crime lab and tested positive for heptane, a
substance found in a variety of primarily petroleum based ignitable liquids.
Rl 18:153. Sneddon testified that in his opinion the fire was intentionally set by
the ignition of an ignitable liquid that was poured onto the floor of the bedroom.
Rl 18:143. When eliciting this testimony, the State admitted two canisters into
evidence containing samples taken from the scene and specifically elicited
testimony that heptane was found in those samples, thereby indicating to the jury
that a heptane-containing ignitable liquid was used to start the fire. Rl 18:155-56.
The idea that alcohol was the ignitable fluid was actually presented as part
of Mr. Landry's defense when he testified that alcohol was spilled on the bedroom
floor the day before the fire and in approximately the same locations where the fire
originated. Rl 19:14-15. Mr. Landry'sfriend,Josephine, was smoking in that
room just prior to the fire. Rl 19:16. The State claims that alcohol spilled the
night before would no longer have been present. Br. Appe. at 20 (citing Marshal
Guynn's testimony).
However, the State's claim is not an accurate reflection of the evidence.
Marshal Guynn actually testified that he could not "give an exact time of
evaporation rate of alcohol. I would struggle with, if it happened on Saturday,
even late Saturday night, still being present Sunday in the afternoon. But again, it
3

could not - if that - if those vapors were ignited they are instantly converted to
flaming combustion and the people present would know." Rl 19:29. Marshal
Guynn also testified that ignitable vapors would not smolder, they would
"explode[.f Rl 19:28.
In short, it was not the State's primary theory at trial that the fire was
started using alcohol.1 To the contrary, the State presented evidence to rebut this
claim and Provo City fire marshal, Jim Guynn, admitted on cross-examination that
the State had no idea what flammable substance was used to start the fire.
Rl 18:191. Thus the State presented evidence suggesting the likelihood that Oscar
alerted on a heptane-containing substance that was used to start the fire, admitted
physical evidence containing heptane, and presented evidence in an attempt to
rebut Mr. Landry's defense that alcohol spilled the night previous to the fire was
the ignitable liquid that caught fire. Rl 19:15; see also, Br. Appt. at 14 (wherein
Mr. Landry stated his belief'that the alcohol spilled on the floor was in about the
location that testimony indicated the fire originated").
Based on the foregoing evidence marshaled, the State's claim the Mr,
Landry failed to marshal the evidence fails.

1

The State cites non-existent "evidence" that Mr. Landry supposedly failed to
marshal when it recites Marshal Guynn's testimony and basically fills in the
blanks to support the State's hindsight theory of the case: "Well, [the crime
laboratory] did identify a hydrocarbon there [—heptane], but they didn't identify
one [—alcohol—] that I would think is responsible for the ignitable pour." Br.
Appe. at 21 (citing and adding to Rl 18:170). Mr. Landry is not required to
marshal the State's self-serving factual embellishments to the trial record.
4

a.

Response to miscellaneous facts described by the State as
Mr, Landry's "challenged and doubtful testimony/'

The State believes it is significant that, while Mr. Landry claimed to have
lost everything in the fire, Mr. Sneddon reported few items of debris were found in
the apartment after the fire, and the clothes closet had little fire debris. Br. Appe.
at 16. The Statefindsthis purported evidence significant only on this appeal, as it
was not an issue at trial. In fact, Rex Nelson testified that after Oscar alerted three
times in the bedroom where the fire originated, Oscar had to be taken out of the
room because there was a lot of fire debris that needed to be removed or
excavated. Rl 18:105. There is no evidence as to what the removed debris was
comprised of or if it included the remains of a suitcase; and it is unlikely there
would have been much debris in the bedroom clothes closet as Mr. Landry
testified he had packed a suitcase with his clothes. Rl 19:13, 24-25.
The State also finds it significant that during his interview with Provo City
Officer Drew Hubbard, Mr. Landry reportedly did not express concern for his
personal belongings. Br. Appe. at 17. The State omits mentioning that when Mr.
Landry was interviewed by Officer Hubbard, Mr. Landry was considered and
treated as a suspect of aggravated arson. Rl 18:124 ("I was there looking to see if
this was criminal in nature.")- Given the likely accusatory tone of such an
investigation, it is not surprising if a suspect does not express concern about his
personal belongings, particularly when he owns so few, as Mr. Landry did here.
Rl 19:13 (Mr. Landry, a survivor of hurricane Katrina, had procured two television
5

sets, a DVD player, a VCR, a bed, a few clothes and some medicine during his
short stay).
The State also claims that Mr. Landry failed to show up for a walk-through
of his apartment scheduled '*with the building manager the night he was to quit the
premises." Br. Appe. at 17. This claim misstates the evidence and puts Mr.
Landry's actions in a false light. Mr. Landry testified that when he left the
apartment prior to the fire, he left his clothes in a suitcase on thefloorbecause he
intended to return to the apartment at 9:00 p.m. when the walk-through was
scheduled. Rl 19:24. The fire occurred around 5:00 p.m. and the walk-through
was scheduled for 9:00 p.m. Rl 18:89-90, 93-94. Notwithstanding the fact that
Mr. Landry did return to the scene upon learning about the fire, it was obviously
impossible for him to do a walk-through of the apartment at that point.
While visiting a friend at a motel, Landry saw the fire on television and
immediately returned to the apartment building, hoping to retrieve his medicine.
Rl 19:19. Once he arrived back on the scene, Mr. Landry was taken into custody
and questioned by police and fire investigators. Id Therefore, it inaccurately
portrays the record facts to argue that Mr. Landry intentionally failed to show up
for the 9:00 p.m. walk-through. The State's claim that this purported failure to
keep his appointment is evidence of Mr. Landry being "incredible, untrustworthy,
and irresponsible" (Br. Appe. at 17) is not supported by the record and is
disingenuous. Mr. Landry had been taken by State investigators to another
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location where he was interrogated and his clothing was taken into evidence.
Rl 18:162, 174-75; Rl 19:27.
The State cites additional evidence that Mr. Landry allegedly failed to
marshal, which evidence tends to show the fire was incendiary in nature.
However, the State admits that Mr. Landryfranklystates in his opening brief that
the State's witnesses reached this conclusion based on burn patterns. Br. Appe. at
18. The State then recites additional and various evidentiary items that Mr.
Landry allegedly failed to marshal. However, all of this evidence was marshaled
in Mr. Landry's opening brief. Br. Appt, at 10 (nothing suggesting an accidental
cause, such as unattended candle, discarded lighter material, or malfunctioning
electrical equipment was found; bum patterns were indicative of a poured
ignitable liquid; no container for such a liquid was found; a cigarette-type lighter
was found outside of the apartment); 11 (Mr. Landry "answered in the negative"
when asked about smoking materials, problems with electrical components, and
chemicals which could decompose and self-heat, in addition to other possible
accidental causes).
There is nothing in the foregoing to support the State's claim that Mr.
Landry is not credible. Further, none of the State's "marshaled" evidence is
sufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Landry committed a crime.

7

II.

THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO MEET THE BURDEN OF PROOF BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT.

Mr. Landry did not argue in his opening brief that a different standard than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt should apply here or in any other criminal case.
The State also does not deny ctthe existence of a reasonable hypothesis of
innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.59 Br.
Appt. at 17 (citing and quoting State v. Layman 953 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App.
1998) (quoting State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221,222 (Utah 1986). The Utah Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in State v. Layman 985 P.2d 911 (Utah 1999) simply
found application of the reasonable hypothesis principal "problematic and
unnecessary" in that case because a sufficiency analysis was adequate. Id.
(upholding this Court's decision that the evidence was insufficient to support the
verdict).
In fact, the reasonable hypothesis test does not create a new standard of
proof. It is simply another way of restating the State's existing burden of proving
every element of a charge beyond a reasonable doubt when the evidence is purely
circumstantial as in this case. In that event, a reasonable hypothesis of innocence
creates reasonable doubt. State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (holding
that because there was no direct evidence that Hill committed the crime, the
existence of a reasonable hypothesis of Hill's innocence meant there was
reasonable doubt).
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There is no direct evidence in this case that Mr. Landry committed
aggravated arson. All of the evidence is circumstantial and the State can cite no
direct evidence to support the verdict in this case. The defense presented evidence
of another unidentified individual who appeared on the scene immediately prior to
the fire and after Mr. Landry had left the premises. Rl 19:6-7. The State's own
evidence supported the possibility that alcohol spilled the night prior to the fire
may not have completely evaporated. Rl 19:29. Further, the State's own witness
admitted on cross-examination that a smoldering cigarette could have ignited an
ignitable fluid spilled on the floor. Rl 18:191. The defense further established that
Mr. Landry returned to the scene upon learning of the fire (Rl 18:105-06, 150,
174; Rl 19:19, 20), an unlikely behavior for one who would perpetrate such a
crime.
All of this evidence supports two reasonable hypotheses that (1) someone
besides Mr. Landry started the fire; or (2) the fire was started unintentionally and
unbeknownst to Mr. Landry, with a smoldering cigarette after he and Josephine
left the apartment.
Even without these reasonable hypotheses of Mr. Landry's innocence, there
is insufficient evidence to support the verdict in this case. The circumstantial
evidence is not "of such a quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" (State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126-27 (Utah
1986) (emphasis added). The State cites State v. Linden, 657 P.2d 1364 (Utah
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1983) (per curiam) as an example of where 'the defendant's nexus to the fire was
much the same as in this case." Br. Appe. at 26.
However, Linden is readily distinguishable from these facts. One witness
saw Linden runfromthe scene of the fire while another witness identified
Linden's car (including the license plate number) in a restaurant parking lot
adjacent to the fire. Id. at 1366-67. Another witness testified he saw Linden at the
scene about two weeks prior to the fire. Id. Despite this evidence, Linden
proffered an alibi defense and testified he was in California at the time of the fire.
He also testified he had not been to Utah for several years, although he was in
possession of a traffic citation issued him in Utah when he was interviewed by
investigators. Id.
Unlike Linden, there is no evidence that Mr. Landry testified falsely in this
case. No eyewitness saw Mr. Landry runfromthe fire. Mr. Landry did not falsely
claim to be in a different state when the fire erupted. Therefore, Linden is not
factually similar to this case and the State was able to meet its burden of proof by
presenting persuasive evidence that Linden was untruthful about his whereabouts.
The State's evidence in this case is substantially weaker than that in Linden.
There is no evidence that Mr. Landry was untruthful in his testimony. There is no
direct evidence linking him to the fire. It is all circumstantial and insufficient to
establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State summarizes the evidence that it believes amounts to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Landry deliberately set the fire as follows: (1)
10

Mr. Landry was seen leaving in a hurried manner 5 minutes prior to the fire being
discovered; (2) there is no evidence that Mr. Landry lost items of personal
property he claimed to have in his possession; (3) there is no evidence that a
smoldering cigarette may have ignited alcohol spilled on Mr. Landry's bedroom
floor, or that he had thought of that possibility when he was interviewed
immediately after the fire; (4) Mr. Landry "showed little concern for his lost
property immediately after the fire"; and (5) Mr. Landry "manifested ... a
disregard for the property he was renting" because he had previously broken a
window to gain entry and his door was broken during an altercation with another
individual. Br. Appe. at 28.
Each of these bases outlined by the State can be refuted individually and
collectively. The mere fact that Mr. Landry appeared to be in a hurry to leave 5
minutes prior to the fire being discovered is not sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that he deliberately set the fire. The State's second claim that
items of Mr. Landry's personal property were not found in the debris is not true.2
2U

Q: Did you find remnants of suitcases or boxes or anything like that?
A:
I don't recall, specifically.... I recall a portion of the stool, burnt umbrella,
a pile of clothing." (Rl 18:149).
"... there were very few things in that room to bum, a few clothes, there was a
couple of small furniture items, the mattress, and the floor coverings ..."
(R118:171).
"I had two T.V.'s, I had my clothes, my medicine, my diabetes medicine, my
pressure medicine, my blood pressure medicine. I had a DVD player, a VCR, my
bed. I had a coat my daughter bought me. I had clothes and shoes. I lost - 1 lost
everything* Everything." (Rl 19:13)*
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Further, Mr. Sneddon testified that a lot of debris had to be removed from the
bedroom. Rl 18:105. It is not clear what this debris was comprised of or if that
removal took place prior to photographs being taken of the scene. Regardless, no
witness for either the prosecution or the defense testified that there was no
suitcase.
The State's third item of evidence offered as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Landry started the fire is similarly unpersuasive. The State's own
witness, Marshal Guynn, testified that a smoldering cigarette could have ignited a
combustible liquid on the floor. Rl 18:191. And while he expressed doubt that
any alcohol spilled the night before would still be present, Marshal Guynn still
could not rule out that possibility because he did not know the evaporation rate or
what kind of alcohol might be involved. Rl 19:29-30. Presumably, the
evaporation rate would be affected by the amount of alcohol spilled, for which
there is no evidence.
The final facts that the State claims support afindingof proof beyond a
reasonable doubt are even less persuasive and are irrelevant. The purported fact

"Q: You are telling us you'd left all of your clothes and all of your belongings
in the apartment up until that time, you hadn't moved anything out.
A:
No, sir.
Q:
Can you explain why the photographs of the closet don't show any burned
clothes?
A:
Because the clothes were in a suitcase on the floor.
Q:
Can you explain why we don't see any evidence of that?
A:
I guess it got burned up." (Rl 19:24-25).
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that Mr. Landry, a Katrina survivor who possessed very little as a result of that
ordeal, did not express concern about the loss of his minimal personal property to
the police officer who was investigating him for arson does not prove anything,
even to a preponderance standard. Further, even if it was relevant, the sketchy
evidence that Mr. Landry had to break a window to get into his own apartment and
that his door was broken during an altercation with another individual does not
suggest he his not credible and certainly does not prove he had a disregard for the
property he was renting.3
The foregoing five circumstantial, and in some instances, irrelevant bases
offered by the State as proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Landry
committed the crime of aggravated arson are insufficient. Yet Mr. Landry has
been deprived of hisfiindamentalright of liberty on this tenuous evidence. While
an argument might be made that this evidence may meet the preponderance
standard, it falls far short even of clear and convincing. It is facially insufficient to
establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Landry committed the crime
for which he has been convicted.

3

In response to Mr. Landry's point that a motive to commit arson cannot be
inferred from the bare fact that the defendant was facing eviction, the State
responds "that an eviction may well motivate arson." Br. Appe. at 28. The State's
argument is not responsive to Mr. Landry's point, which is that a motive to
commit arson cannot be presumed merely from a pending eviction. There must be
extraneous evidence tending to prove that motive.
13

CONCLUSION
Even when construed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
in this case is insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Landry
committed the crime for which he has been convicted. Accordingly, Mr. Landiy
respectfully asks this Court to so find and to vacate his conviction.
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of October, 2008.

JenniferfcXGbwansI
Attorney for Mr. Landry

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of October, 2008,1 caused to be handdelivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant
to the following:
Kenneth Bronston
Utah Attorney General's Office
Appeals Division
160 East 300 South
6th Floor
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

14

